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IS THE LAW MALE?: THE ROLE OF EXPERTS
SARAH

E. BURNS*

We have been asked in this Symposium to address the question,
"Is the law male?" This question, or the answering of it, requires us
tacitly to acknowledge that human activities and institutions can be
gendered just as people are gendered-in other words, to apprehend
that "gender" is a construct rather than a biological fact.1 Once we
have accepted this premise, we also discover that engendering 2 is a
transformative process that can be ongoing and ever-changing. This
Symposium is part of that process.
Rather than prejudge the answer to our ultimate question and
thus truncate the transformation entailed in fully addressing it, 3 I propose to address a narrower, but nonetheless relevant, question: Does
the law reflect gender bias? The answer is generally yes, and the bias
is primarily male. What can we do to address that bias or the
processes by which it operates in law? Let me point to evolving solutions that use research on social cognition and sex stereotyping to analyze the dynamics of sex discrimination.
We have learned several things about engendering from social
science research. We have learned that biased conduct may prevail
even where well-meaning people are involved. We have learned that
it is possible to eliminate that bias, albeit with some difficulty. We
have learned that we cannot necessarily trust our perceptions-that
inequality may appear fair and fairness may be seen as favoritism. Finally we have learned that, if equality is our goal, it is important not
only to change behavior at critical junctures involving the distribution
of resources and opportunities, but also, ultimately, to change
4
perception.
* Associate Professor of Clinical Law, New York University School of Law. J.D. Yale
University, 1979; M.A. Stanford University, 1976, M.A. University of Oklahoma, 1972; B.A.
University of Oklahoma, 1971.
1. See Sarah E. Bums, Apologia for the Status Quo, 74 GEO. L.J. 1791 (1986) (reviewing
DAVID L. KiR, ET AL., GENDER JUSTICE (1986)).
2. This usage is borrowed from Martha Minow, Foreword:Justice Engendered, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 10 (1987).
3. As one example of the work of transforming the law, see Peggy C. Davis, Contextual
Legal Criticism:A Demonstration Exploring Hierarchyand "Feminine" Style, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1635 (1991), in which the author explores advantages of "feminine" problem-solving styles in
some lawyering contexts.
4. See generally SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITON (2d ed. 1991).
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This learning is grounded in a range of research concerning the
way in which categorizing according to sex- and race-based characteristics affects our perceptions, memories, inferences, and social and
task group interactions. Our learning is amplified by the research on
the social and cultural meanings assigned to-the "stereotypes
about"-our sex and race. The effects of stereotyping are compounded by the tendencies to in-group preference.
As a result of this learning we are able to call upon the expertise
of social scientists to help us identify and change bias and stereotyping. This enterprise marks an important purpose for which we have
used expert testimony in the courtroom. The most prominent example was in the Title VII case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,5 in which
a female senior associate challenged the "Big Six" accounting firm's
denial of partnership to her. The plaintiff, the only female candidate,
had brought in more money and business than the other eighty or
more male partnership candidates. 6 She was passed over for partnership selection with the advice that she might succeed with a later try if
7
she presented a more feminine image.
Expert witness Dr. Susan Fiske testified about the evidence of
stereotyping, concluding that the denial of partnership to the plaintiff
was partially the result of sex stereotyping and thus to some extent
based upon the plaintiff's sex.8 The trial court accepted this conclusion, as well as the defendant's arguments that the plaintiff had an
abrasive personality, 9 which occasioned the court's use of the mixed
motive proof scheme that took the case to the Supreme Court. In
preparing their brief of amicus curiae in support of Hopkins's position
for the Supreme Court, the American Psychological Association surveyed the research literature pertinent to the expert testimony in that
case. They specifically located over 12,000 relevant studies. 10
When experts clarify how bias affected the events at issue in a
case, they also educate the trier of fact as to the selfsame problems
potentially present in the court's own decision making." In this respect, it may be more important for the expert to testify as to what the
5. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
6. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1112 (D.D.C. 1985).
7. See id. at 1117.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1120.
10. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of Respondent
at 7-8 & nf. 6-8, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167).
11. I refer the reader to the extensive work of Lynn Hecht Schafran on gender bias in the
courts and the now-numerous studies on gender bias in court systems. See, e.g., Lynn Hecht
Schafran, Is the Law Male?: Let Me Count the Ways, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 397 (1993).
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research establishes rather than offer any conclusion as to an ultimate
fact-law determination in the case. Presented in this manner, expert
testimony can be helpful even if we encounter some objection to its
use on the grounds that the expert's conclusions might usurp jury decision making.
Perhaps it would be helpful to provide an example of a bias expert educating a trier of fact concerning the dynamics of bias to explain the events at issue in a case and the perceptions of witnesses
concerning them. In the Title VII action litigated by NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,12 a female first-class welder sued her employer, Jacksonville Shipyards, for
maintaining a sexually hostile work environment. She claimed that
the presence of sexual pictures of women prominently displayed in
offices, shops, and other common places; other verbal and physical
sexual conduct; and the employer's practice of condoning these activities made the workplace sexually hostile to her and other female
13
employees.
In an effort to explain the dynamics of stereotyping in the workplace, plaintiff offered expert testimony, by Dr. Fiske, that the conditions at the shipyards presented classic problems of stereotyping. 14
Based upon a variety of factors including the rarity of women, the
presence of sexually-based priming in the form of verbal harassment
and displaying of sexual pictures of women, a power hierarchy in
which women were at the bottom, and the absence of a professional
norm of conduct such as an effective sexual harassment policy, the
expert concluded that a number of effects of stereotyping could be
expected to appear. 15 The perceptions of the men-and some of the
women-about women would be organized along the lines of stereotypes about females. Because females were represented in such small
numbers and thus highly visible, there would be heightened attention
to them and sex-based explanations of their activities; yet similarly
close observation of men and sex-based explanations of their behavior
would not occur. 16 As a result of these dynamics, and the effects of
the fact that women constituted an out-group, the managers would
also tend to trivialize the concerns or complaints of the women, ex12.
Dec. 2,
13.
14.
15.
16.

760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991), appeal docketed, No. 91-3655, (11th Cir. argued
1992) (supplemental briefing submitted Jan. 18, 1994).
Id. at 1490.
Id. at 1503.
Id. at 1503-05.
Id. at 1504.
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plaining those concerns away based on sex stereotypes about women. 17 All of these conclusions were solidly founded on research that
is, in scientific terms, well established as to both internal and external
validity and peer review acceptance.
From the conditions in the workplace, and the learning on social
cognition, a number of things could be predicted. The women would
regularly be talked about in terms of their sex, and because the workplace was sexualized, in terms of their sexuality. 18 Thus an incident in
which a male worker exposed his genitals to a female worker would
lead not to concern about the wrongness of the man's behavior and an
effort to remedy it, but to the concern that disciplining the man would
hurt his job status and to rationalizations that the woman ought to
expect such things. It also prompted speculation about whether she
"really liked" being subjected to the exposure and, if she did not
whether she was frigid. 19 In such a circumstance, women would naturally be reluctant to complain or in any other way call more attention
to themselves than they already suffered simply by being women in
that setting. The evidence in the case confirmed the predictions.
The expert's testimony explained the sex-based nature of this
conduct. It also put into perspective the assessment by the employer,
its supervisors, and employees that a woman was being hysterical and
overreacting when she had reported sexual harassment problems. As
one part of the employer's defense, the employer 2° argued that the
women participated in the atmosphere, and were no more harmed by
it than were the men. 21 Defendants also sought to show that women
had no serious complaints about their work environment and that
whatever complaints were made had been adequately remedied. To
establish these points the defendants sought to show, among other
things, that one of the plaintiff's key witnesses participated in making
the workplace hostile and had not objected to it. That witness, another woman worker, testified that she was bothered by the sexual
pictures of women in the workplace because she found that the men
behaved in a sexualized manner in the presence of the pictures 22 even
17. Id. at 1502-05.
18. Id. at 1503.
19. Id. at 1504.
20. The defendants included the company and a number of supervisory agents of the
company.
21. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1499.
22. Id. at 1500. Her view was buttressed by research that established that 50% of men
exposed to soft core pornography responded by perceiving and treating in a sexual manner women with whom they interacted after the exposure. Id. at 1503 (citing Doug McKenzie-Mohr &
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though she was not concerned about the content of the sexual pictures
in themselves. 23 As a result of her perception that the men behaved
differently around the pictures, she stayed as much as possible away
from the places where the pictures were located and avoided the men
associated with those places. 24 Her job, however, required her to have

25
frequent contact with most shops and trades.
Defendants sought to discredit this witness by showing that she

had the "foulest mouth" in the shipyards. When questioned about her
specific word cheices some witnesses reported that she had used a

phrase like "motherfucker. ' '26 One of the defendant's witnesses testified that he had worked around that female employee on occasions
and asserted that she had used "crude" language. In fact he testified
on cross examination that she had said, "Hell. I don't care what I say.

Screw you all. I say what I want to say. The hell with

''

it. 27

It was this

language that had prompted his telling her, as he reported in his direct

examination, that, "[y]ou should be ashamed of yourself. It's not re-

spectable for a lady to be saying things like that. ' 28 Cross-examination probed his own use of crude language and the fact that he and
others unashamedly used that and much worse language in the shipyards. 29 He defended himself with the argument, "[w]ell, it seems

more nicer coming from a man than it does coming from a lady,
yes."30

The expert testimony explained how, in an atmosphere in which
gross sexual expression is commonplace for men whose use of it goes
unchecked, a woman is negatively-judged when she may resort even
to the most benign versions of the common parlance. 3 1 On the basis
Maria P. Zanna, Treating Women as Sex Objects: Look to the (Gender Schematic) Male Who Has
Viewed Pornography, 16 PERS. & Soc. PsYcH. BULL. 296 (1990)).

23. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1500.
24. Id.
25. See id. ("Banks [the witness] observed pictures of nude and partially nude women
throughout the workplace.") (emphasis added).
26. 7 Trial Transcript at 100-02, Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (No. 86-927) [hereinafter Robinson Trial Transcript] (testimony of Herbert
Kennedy). Other testimony offered by the plaintiff showed that the circumstances of her use of
this language were often ones in which she had been provoked by the harassment or abuse of a
male coworker. E.g. 3 Robinson Trial Transcript, supra, at 42-48, 52-68. Testimony also showed
"motherfucker" to be a pallid epithet compared to the customary language of the shipyards. See
Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1498-1501.
27. 7 Robinson Trial Transcript, supra note 26, at 160 (testimony of George Livingston).
28. Id. at 159.
29. Id. at 161.
30. Id.
31. See 4 Robinson Trial Transcript, supra note 26, at 171-202; 5 Robinson Trial Transcript,
.supra note 26, at 3-43.
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of this and other testimony showing sexual abuse and a dual standard
based upon sex, the trial court concluded that the employer maintained a hostile work environment for the plaintiff and other women
32
employees.
One principle guided the use of this research: in attempting to
understand, explain, or predict conduct, attention to the contexts in
which events occur is important. The beauty of court-made law, albeit
expensive, is its ability to examine specific facts in particular contexts.
On this note, however, the provocative observations by political scientist Kim Lane Scheppele are instructive. Scheppele points out that it
is not only the substantive content of the law and the potential for bias
in the thought processes of decision makers that make law hostile to
women. Bias also rests in the time-honored standards for trial truthtesting. Scheppele observes that the law values as true stories of
events that are promptly conveyed, consistent, and unchanged. 33 But
what about the female token in the nontraditional workplace who
may hesitate to complain because she does not want to subject herself
to greater scrutiny? What about a woman's experience of sexual
abuse? Cultural and psychological effects of sex-based harm may discourage the naming of its cause. Accordingly, when a woman does
come forward about sexual abuse that occurred in a family or friendship, at work or on the street, the manner in which she comes forward
may not comport with the requirements of consistency and promptness privileged in legal fact-finding. She may at first have tried to dismiss the abuse as unimportant, to forgive the abuser, or even to claim
it was her own fault, only to discover upon reflection that her initial
reaction was obviously wrong. Legal truth-finding techniques favor a
conclusion that she is a liar for her carefully considered insight.
This problem has demanded attention in Robinson and cases like
it. In Robinson, we offered expert and factual evidence to explain, for
example, how different women may react to sex-based harassment,
how different women may have been harmed, and why they failed to
complain. 34 Similarly, we used expert testimony to explain how to
prevent harassment and its harm. 35 In using these strategies, we may
be able to eliminate bias without resort to special legal standards re32. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1491.
33. Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts Ma'am:Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and
the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123, (1992).
34. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1505-07. 4 Robinson Trial Transcript, supra note 26, at 84-171
(testimony of expert K.C. Wagner).
35. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1518-19.
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lating to gender that may well introduce more bias than they eliminate. 36 Solutions in one case may, in addition, provide building blocks
for success in other instances of legal problem-solving.

36. For an example drawn from recent work on battered women of a discussion of the
pitfalls of, and the misconceptions behind, special standards for women, see Holly Maguigan,
Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals,140
U. PA. L. REv. 379 (1991).

